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THE SUITABILITY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S
BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEDURE IN THE
REORGANIZATION OF SMALL- TO
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES: LESSONS
FROM CHAPTER 11 OF THE UNITED
STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE
Mikovhe Maphiri *
South African small- to medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) are the bread and
butter of our economy. Providing much-needed employment and developing
the skills of historically disadvantaged persons formally and informally are
some of the most significant benefits of SMEs in a developing country such as
South Africa. However, despite these significant contributions to the socioeconomic development of the country, SMEs generally have the lowest survival
rates in the world as compared to large enterprises globally, resulting in high
rates of business failure and the loss of jobs which these entities create. The
Companies Act of 2008 replaces the previous judicial management corporate
reorganization procedure for companies in South Africa with the new business
rescue model and a compromise between a company and its creditors.
Business rescue provides companies in financial distress with the opportunity
to reorganize, strategize, and devise reorganization measures that are useful,
efficient, and capable of yielding a better return for creditors than liquidation.
This Comment comparatively analyzes whether the South African corporate
rescue systems, past and present, have developed in line with the needs and
interests of South African SMEs in a manner that is efficient and sensitive to
the inherent weakness of our economy and the distinctive needs of SMEs in a
developing country such as South Africa.
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INTRODUCTION
In developing countries, there is a consensus among policymakers, economists, and business experts that SMEs drive economic growth and development. 1 A developing country such as South Africa requires a healthy SME sector that will contribute to the economy by generating employment opportunities,
increasing productivity, promoting entrepreneurial skills, and breeding more
import and export opportunities for South Africans. 2 It is imperative that South
Africa promotes an environment that will allow SMEs to grow, and in doing so,
alleviates poverty and addresses the dynamics of socio-economic inequality
leftover from the apartheid regime. 3 SMEs therefore serve as a catalyst through

1. UNDERHILL CORP. SOLUTIONS, LITERATURE REVIEW ON SMALL AND MEDIUM
ENTERPRISES’ ACCESS TO CREDIT AND SUPPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA 7 (2011) (prepared for South
Africa’s National Credit Regulator (“NCR”)), http://www.ncr.org.za/pdfs/Research_Reports/
Literature%20Review%20on%20SME%20Access%20to%20Credit%20in%20South%20Africa_
Final%20Report_NCR_Dec%202011.pdf [hereinafter LITERATURE REVIEW].
2. Id.
3. South Africa’s previous apartheid regime passed laws that segregated groups of people
based on race and skin color. After the National Party won the South African parliamentary election
of 1948, its President instituted apartheid by way of legislation. For example, the Immigrants Regulation Act No. 22 of 1913 excluded persons not literate in a European language and other so-called
“undesirables” from the country. In some cases, apartheid legislation split families; parents could be
classified as white while their children were classified as colored. This racial divide severely limited
economic opportunities for historically disadvantaged groups, leading to high rates of income inequality and poverty. The harmful effects of apartheid linger in present-day South Africa. See gener-

Fall 2018]

Lessons from Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code

103

which the socio-economic goals of developing countries are to be achieved. 4
However, despite the herculean role that SMEs play in developing economies,
SMEs in South Africa have the lowest survival rate in the world and often operate in financial distress. 5
This Comment focuses on business rescue as a corporate reorganization
procedure for South African SMEs. Part II discusses the role of SMEs in the
South African economy. Parts III and IV address the development of South African bankruptcy law. Part IV offers a comparative analysis of the system codified in Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Both laws facilitate
corporate reorganization procedures for enterprises of all sizes, including SMEs.
This Comment will ultimately offer a series of recommendations for policymakers in South Africa.
I. THE ROLE OF SMES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
A PLATFORM FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A. The Definition and Role of SMEs in Developing Countries
While the existence, power, and influence of SMEs is internationally
acknowledged by policy makers and business experts, there is no uniform definition of an SME. 6 Most countries adopt either an economic or statistical definition of the SME unique to their own legal and economic structure. 7 An economic definition of an SME will consider, among other factors, the annual
turnover of the company, the company’s net worth and the company’s profitability. 8 Alternatively, a statistical definition will measure the SME sector based
on the size of the workforce within the company. 9
In developing countries, SMEs are mostly characterized as single-owner
business, in which the working staff can be family members who are often unpaid directors active in the management and overall administration of the enter-

ally Michael R. Carter & Julian May, One Kind of Freedom: Poverty Dynamics in Post-Apartheid
South Africa 29 WORLD DEV. 1987 (2001).
4. See LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1. The new democratic regime in South Africa
introduced a progressive constitution which identified the socio-economic goals of South Africa.
REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., COUNTRY REPORT 2013 11 (2013), http://www.za.undp.org/content/dam/
south_africa/docs/Reports/The_Report/MDG_October-2013.pdf (outlining the eight socio-economic
goals for South Africa: (1) to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, (2) to promote universal primary education, (3) to promote gender equality and empower women, (4) to reduce child mortality, (5)
to improve maternal health, (6) to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, (7) to ensure environmental sustainability, and (8) to develop a global partnership for the development).
5. LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 15.
6. Id. at 22.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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prise. 10 Developing African countries have identified SMEs as enterprises that
are more labor-intensive than larger firms with lower capital costs. 11 For example, Ghana, a developing country, has adopted its own unique definition by using statistical factors to define the SME sector within its own economic system. 12 In Ghana, the underlying criterion used in defining the SME sector has
been the employee component of the enterprise. 13 Ghana distinctly defines
SMEs as companies with fewer than 10 employees, or medium-sized companies
with more than 10 employees. 14 In another example, Malawi, also a developing
country, defines its SME sector based on levels of capital investments, employees, and the total annual turnover of the company. 15 In the United States, the
definition of an SME varies by industry and the number of workers, and the
value and number of assets that the SME enterprise has informs the size of the
SME enterprise. 16 For example, in the manufacturing industry, an SME is
deemed to have 500 employees or fewer, and in the wholesale trade industry, an
SME has fewer than 100 employees. 17
In South Africa, the issue of what constitutes an SME is correspondingly a
matter of debate by economists, entrepreneurs, and business law writers. 18
Chapter 1 of the National Small Business Act of 1996 provides a statutory definition of ‘small business,’ which has been used for academic purposes as an inclusive definition for SMEs in South Africa. 19 The National Small Business
Act defines ‘small business’ as:
[A] separate and distinct business entity, including cooperative enterprises and nongovernmental organi[z]ations, managed by one owner or more which, including its
branches or subsidiaries, if any, is predominantly carried on in any sector or subsector of the economy mentioned in column I of the Schedule and which can be
classified as a micro-, a very small, a small or a medium enterprise by satisfying
20
the criteria mentioned in columns 3, 4 and 5 of the Schedule.

In practice this definition has been interpreted broadly enough by State
Small Enterprise Development Agencies (“SEDA”) 21 to include both SMEs and

10. See Joshua Abor & Peter Quartey, Issues in SME Development in Ghana and South Africa, 39 INT’L RES. J. FIN. & ECON. 218, 222 (2010).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 222–23.
13. LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 89.
14. Id. at 89–90.
15. Id. at 90.
16. See generally Susan Ward, SME Definition (Small to Medium Enterprise), BALANCE
(Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/sme-small-to-medium-enterprise-definition-2947962
(reviewing the definitions of SMEs in various developed and developing economies).
17. See id.
18. See LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 24.
19. National Small Business Act 102 of 1996 (S. Afr.).
20. Id. at Ch. I.
21. SEDA is a small enterprise development agency in South Africa established under the
National Small Businesses Amendment Act 29 of 2004. SEDA’s mission is to develop, support,
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Small Micro Medium Enterprises (“SMMEs”) as “small businesses for the purposes of the Act.” 22 The National Small Business Act’s reference to SMEs is
important for the purposes of this Comment in determining whether these businesses can achieve the benefits of business rescue under Chapter 6 of the Companies Act of 2008. This Comment restricts the definition of SME to companies registered under the Companies Act of 2008 that qualify as a small
business under Chapter 1 of the National Small Business Act. 23
It is imperative to note at the earliest stage of this Comment the significant
contributions the SME sector has made in South Africa. It is a well-known fact
that various aspects of South African society have undergone transformation
since the first non-racial democratic elections were held on April 27, 1994. 24
The elections transformed South Africa’s socio-political structure, including the
reformation of old apartheid laws which discriminated against people of color in
both the social and economic sectors. 25 This transformation was facilitated by
the introduction of the new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 26 The
Constitution aims to protect and maintain democracy by promoting human dignity, equality, and freedom of all persons in all sectors, including the business
world. 27 For that reason, one purpose of the Companies Act of 2008 is the
promotion of and compliance with the Constitution’s Bill of Rights in relation
to companies doing business in South Africa. 28
SMEs are required to function within the facets of socio-economic transformation, as they are expected to assist in the social and economic transition of
the people of South Africa by improving overall quality of life and providing
much-needed value and growth of the economy. 29 This is of absolute im-

and promote small businesses throughout South Africa in coordination with various groups, including global partners who assist local entrepreneurs. See generally THE SMALL ENTERPRISE
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, http://www.seda.org.za/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
22. National Small Business Act 102 of 1996 (S. Afr.).
23. Id. at Ch. I.
24. L.P. Kruger, The Impact of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) on South African
Businesses: Focusing on Ten Dimensions of Business Performance, 15 S. AFR. BUS. REV. 207, 207
(2011). The reformation process in South Africa further included the introduction of the BroadBased Black Economic Empowerment (“BBBEE”) strategies and programs. Id. at 208. BBBEE
strategies aim to provide corporate opportunities to historically disadvantaged persons and redress
the effects of past political injustices by broadening the economic participation of the black majority. Id. at 209. For this reason, SMEs have been and are still used as engines to drive economic reform in South Africa, and to empower historically disadvantaged persons, as advised by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Furthermore, SMEs are used as implementation tools for
BBBEE strategies which aim at facilitating corporate reform in South Africa by addressing unemployment and poverty challenges which remain under-addressed in South Africa to this day.
25. Id. at 208.
26. S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
27. See id.
28. Companies Act 71 of 2008, § 7(a) (S. Afr.).
29. See Anna Kesper, Failing or Not Aiming to Grow? Manufacturing SMMEs and Their
Contribution to Employment Growth in South Africa, 12 URB. F. 171, 175 (2001).
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portance because the South African economy is currently characterized by high
levels of unemployment along with low levels of both productivity and international competitiveness of SME companies. 30
However, notwithstanding these challenges to economic growth in South
Africa, research shows that the formal sector continues to shed jobs and decrease its employment absorption rate in the midst of economic and business
distress. 31 There is, therefore, a need to create an optimal environment for entrepreneurship by developing and cultivating the individual business skills of
historically disadvantaged persons and unemployed graduates in South Africa. 32
In other words, the development, promotion, and protection of SMEs must be
cultivated as a useful method for eradicating poverty and promoting growth,
which is vital in achieving long-term economic sustainability and development
in South Africa. 33 Scholars and economists perceive SMEs as entities that are
critical in moving the socio-economic development trajectory in South Africa
from poverty to prosperity. As discussed above, SMEs play a crucial role in the
South African economy, providing much-needed employment, experience, and
income to stakeholders, thereby making an immense contribution to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”). 34 It is in response to this reality that
Trevor Manuel, in his capacity as then Minister of Trade and Industry, explained:
Throughout the world one finds that SMMEs are playing a critical role in absorbing
labo[u]r, penetrating new markets and generally expanding economies in creative
and innovative ways. We are of the view that–with the appropriate enabling environment–SMMEs in this country can follow these examples and make an indelible
35
mark on this economy.

This explains why, 24 years later, SMEs are still of crucial importance to
the economy. This is evidenced by the fact that in 2014 alone SMEs contributed up to 52 and 57 percent of South Africa’s GDP and absorbed up to 80 percent of the national labor force. 36

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. There has been an increase in the number of unemployed graduates in South Africa.
Studies show that this unemployment is primarily embedded in historically disadvantaged communities. See generally Kim Baldry, Graduate Unemployment in South Africa: Social Inequality Reproduced, 29 J. EDUC. & WORK 788 (2014). As a result, graduates in South Africa engage in entrepreneurship through SMEs to alleviate poverty and unemployment. Id.
33. See Kesper, supra note 29, at 175.
34. LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 7.
35. DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUS., THE WHITE PAPER ON NATIONAL STRATEGY AND
PROMOTION OF SMALL BUSINESSES IN SOUTH AFRICA (1995), https://www.thedti.gov.za/
sme_development/docs/White_paper.pdf.
36. LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 7.
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B. The Failure Rate of SMEs in South Africa
Despite the significance of SME companies to the economy, SMEs around
the world, particularly in South Africa, are faced with numerous challenges that
impede their growth. 37 In the early 2000s, it was found that between 70 and 80
percent of all South African SMEs fail within their first five years of incorporation; in fact, the failure rate of South African SMEs has been described by researchers as one of the worst in the world. 38
Three common attributes account for the low survival rate of SMEs in
South Africa. First, financing: SMEs are typically financed through private
family wealth or bank loans. They do not have the capacity to fundraise their
financing by issuing share capital to the general public like larger entities. 39
SMEs are often undercapitalized entities; 40 they do not have adequate immovable and valuable movable property to offer as security to financial institutions
when in need of financing. 41 Second, access to skilled labor, or lack thereof,
plays an important role in determining the success of a company and improving
the strategy of companies in any industry. 42 In developing countries, SMEs are
usually family-owned enterprises. 43 They are formed by family members with
the intention of improving their financial circumstances and possibly breaking
long chains of generational poverty. 44 The bonds inherent in such family relations can contribute to the failure of such SMEs because important financial decisions are made without implementing business analytical strategies or enforcing good corporate governance strategies. 45 This is due to the fact that family
relationships are culturally and religiously based on strong emotional ties. 46
Thus business decisions, which are meant to be made independently and with
sound mind and reasoning, are made emotionally based on long-term trust
among family members. 47 Finally, there is no major separation between ownership and control in SMEs: the managers of the company are in many cases the

37. Id.
38. Id. at 20. Although SME business activity constitutes approximately 40% of South Africa’s total GDP, this this figure is relatively small compared to other developing countries such as
China (60%) and Brazil (59%). See generally Fatoki Olawale & Van Aardt Smit, Business Environmental Influences on the Availability of Debt to New SMEs in South Africa, 4 AFR. J. BUS.
MGMT. 1778, 1778–1779 (2010).
39. DAVID MILMAN, GOVERNANCE OF DISTRESSED FIRMS: CORPORATIONS,
GLOBALISATION AND THE LAW 35 (2013).
40. Id.
41. See LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 35.
42. See generally Abor & Quartey, supra note 10, (arguing that the lack of management
skills as well as the lack of finance to acquire management skills leads to the failure of SME companies).
43. MILMAN, supra note 39, at 36.
44. See id. at 35–36.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 36.
47. See id.
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majority and controlling share shareholders of the enterprise, and they have all
the voting rights and often make company decisions at their own discretion with
no special resolutions. 48 This leads to an abuse of power by SME directors, as
the separation of ownership and control within SMEs is not clearly distinguished. These characteristics ultimately lead to the financial distress of SMEs
in South Africa. This weakness is unique in the South African case because of
the country’s socio-political history of apartheid. From an economic perspective, the apartheid regime in South Africa primarily excluded the economic participation of historically disadvantaged persons from mainstream business participation and executive management positions. The economic exclusion of
historically disadvantaged persons by the apartheid government influenced the
deficiency of astute business skills in most SMEs owned by historically disadvantaged persons as the apartheid laws and education aimed at excluding the
black majority from engaging in mainstream business activities and education
which are crucial in installing the business skills that most SMEs need to be
profitable in the long run. This process therefore cuts short the ability of SMEs
to contribute positively to the economy and limits the achievement of socioeconomic objectives and poverty reduction. However, recourse for SMEs in
financial distress can be pursued through the business rescue model. The question now becomes whether SMEs in financial distress can devise successful reorganization strategies through a Chapter 6 business rescue procedure under the
Companies Act of 2008.
II. HISTORY OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
Over the last four decades, South Africa has made use of corporate reorganization strategies in the form of judicial management and business rescue. The
Companies Act of 2008 entirely replaced judicial management as a corporate
reorganization procedure in South Africa. The success and failure of these procedures in relation to SMEs is discussed below.
A. Judicial Management Under the Companies Act of 1973
South Africa was one of the first countries to introduce a judicial management corporate reorganization regime. 49 Judicial management was formally introduced by way of legislation in the South Africa’s Companies Act of 1926. 50
At that particular time, the concept of judicial management was unfamiliar to
any other comparable legal system. 51 Judicial management was re-enacted in
48. Id.
49. Anneli Loubser, Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Procedure in South African
Corporate Law, 16 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L.J. 137, 139 (2004).
50. See id. at 138. The academic debate on judicial management as a corporate rescue procedure in South Africa was not a highly pursued topic until the early 2000s. This was primarily influenced by the liquidation culture in most corporate entities.
51. Id.
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the South Africa’s Companies Act of 1973 in an attempt by South Africa to
align itself with international trends and to follow developments of corporate
reorganization in Great Britain. 52 Judicial management as a corporate rescue
procedure offered companies that were unable to pay their debts but wished to
operate as a going concern two alternatives through which they could possibly
restructure. 53 The purpose of judicial management, as set out in terms of Section 427 of the Companies Act 1973, 54 was primarily to restructure the distressed company. Coupled with this was the aim of determining whether there
was a “reasonable probability” 55 that the company would be able to pay its
debts or to meet its obligations and become a successful concern if it were
placed under judicial management. 56 Moreover, given the circumstances, the
re-enactment under the Companies Act 1973 was seen as a bona fide attempt by
the legislature to remain relevant and progressive by borrowing from developments in Great Britain.
However promising in theory, judicial management has been labelled a
‘spectacular and abject failure.’ 57 This was due to the fact that it was rarely
used and required a high threshold of proof: a ‘reasonable probability’ rather
than a mere possibility that creditor claims would eventually be paid in full
when an enterprise is placed under judicial management in the Companies Act
1973. 58 Scholars who have studied in this area argue that the judicial management made the process of restructuring more burdensome for enterprises trying
to restructure under the provisions of Sections 427–440 of the Companies Act
1973. This was because judicial management relied heavily on court procedures which made the restructuring process more expensive, especially for
small to medium enterprises.
Furthermore, Section 427 of the Companies Act 1973 59 did not set out in
clear terms the categories of companies to which judicial management applied. 60 The use of the word “company” was vague and narrow, and it was not
52. See generally Tshepo H. Mongalo, An Overview of Company Law Reform in South Africa: From the Guidelines to the Companies Act 2008, 2010 ACTA JURIDICA xiii (2010); Loubser,
supra note 49, at 138.
53. See Companies Act 61 of 1973 §§ 427–440 (S. Afr.); see also Anthony J. Smits, “Corporate Administration”—A Proposed Model, 32 DE JURE 80, 83 (1999).
54. Smits, supra note 53, at 85.
55. Companies Act 61 of 1973 §§ 427–40 (S. Afr.).
56. Loubser, supra note 49, at 141–42.
57. Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd., 2012 (3) SA 273
(GSJ), at 5.
58. Blessing Tselane, The Requirements for Business Rescue Proceedings Under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 as Discussed in SWART v. Beagles Run Investments 25 (PTY) LTD (FOUR
CREDITORS INTERVENING) 2011 (5) SA 422 GNP (Oct. 2012) (unpublished L.L.B. dissertation, University of South Africa) (on file with author).
59. Companies Act 61 of 1973 (S. Afr.).
60. Anneli Loubser, Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South African
Company Law (Feb. 2002) (unpublished L.D. dissertation) (on file with author) [hereinafter
“Loubser Thesis”].
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clear whether this would include all types of companies like public corporations
and close corporation, for example. 61 The question therefore arose whether the
highly litigious and professionally dominated judicial management procedure
under the Companies Act 1973 accommodated SMEs in financial distress in
South Africa.
The Companies Act 1973 failed to acknowledge the significant contributions that SMEs in financial distress can provide to not only the socio-economic
development of the country, but to the entire global economic community. This
resulted in the lack of a seasoned corporate rescue regime sensitive to the needs
and culture of the society in which it was seeded. 62 Significantly, Rajak &
Henning, in their analysis of business rescue for South Africa, recommend that
South Africa have a dual corporate rescue regime. 63 Such a regime would cater
to large, complex financial and industrial mainstream activity with a more robust and premium international standard. Conversely, it would also cater to
smaller companies with a less sophisticated standard. 64 It is therefore important
to acknowledge, as Rajak & Henning do, that South Africa recognizes the need
to encourage the sustainable growth of SMEs and the successful restructuring of
companies of all sizes. 65 In view of its extensive shortcomings, judicial management as a corporate rescue procedure was abolished in its entirety in South
Africa’s Companies Act of 2008.
In light of this argument, Rajak & Henning were correct in proposing a dual
corporate rescue system for South African companies. 66 They advocated for the
provision of a domestic approach, one which is more sensitive to the needs of
the South African economy and therefore less formal and more inclusive. 67 The
past judicial management restructuring procedure was too litigious in nature and
created a corporate rescue environment that was inaccessible for SMEs in financial distress. This critical flaw inspired a call for corporate law reform in
South Africa.

61. Id. at 17.
62. Harry Rajak & Johan Henning, Business Rescue for South Africa, 116 S. AFR. L.J. 262,
269 (1999).
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 7.
66. See Rajak & Henning, supra note 62. A dual corporate rescue system distinguishes between formal and informal business rescue proceedings. The use of either formal or informal business rescue proceedings would be dependent on the size of the distressed company—in terms of
both revenue and number of employees. A formal business rescue procedure would follow the formal court process and require the appointment of a business rescue practitioner. An informal business rescue procedure would be less judicial and would require the financially distressed company
to facilitate business rescue proceedings without outsourcing the services of a business rescue practitioner. Separating these two processes will be useful in reducing the costs of business rescue. Id.
67. Id.
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B. The Call for Reform
The need for a change in South Africa’s corporate insolvency law has been
the subject of debate since the late 1980s. 68 This need arose from South Africa’s traditional liquidation system and culture. 69 Hence, bankruptcy laws are
devised to maximize creditor recovery through the liquidation of an insolvent
estate. 70 A creditor of a company that is failing to pay its debts due to him has a
right by law (ex debito justitiae) to liquidate the company. 71 An expected consequence of this right is that entering liquidation will result in the winding up of
the company and the auctioning of the company’s assets for the purpose of securing the payment of the debts owed to the creditors. 72
This liquidation system is popular across the world because it provides
creditors with immediate results. Liquidation does not give companies in financial distress opportunities to secure the help of a business rescue practitioner
and enjoy moratorium against the company’s creditors. To this day, the liquidation system is traditionally justified and highly preferred by creditors because it
provides the most orderly and efficient means of securing the return of debts. 73
In June 2004, the Department of Trade and Industry provided a solid justification for the repeal of the Companies Act 1973. 74 The 1973 Act remained in
force until April 31, 2011 and was replaced by the 2008 Act the following day.
The Companies Act of 1973 had provided the regulatory framework for company law for 35 years. The Department of Trade and Industry’s rationale behind
corporate law reform was that the 1973 Act was now outdated, far too formal,
consisted of laws which were unnecessary, and limited the effective participation of historically disadvantaged persons in the economy. 75 One of the reasons
given for the repeal was the need to ensure that the regulatory frameworks for
enterprises of all types of businesses, including micro, very small, and medium
enterprises, are accommodated. 76 Doing so would promote growth, employment, innovation, stability, good governance, investor confidence, and international competitiveness in South Africa. 77 Hence, the repeal of Companies Act
1973 demonstrated a recognition of the need to facilitate corporate law reform

68. Oakdene Square Props. v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami), 2012 (3) SA 273 (GSJ), at 5
para. 6 (S. Afr.).
69. Id.
70. Smits, supra note 53, at 82.
71. Oakdene Square Props., 2012 (3) SA 273 (GSJ), at 5 para. 6.
72. See ROBERT SHARROCK ET AL., HOCKLY’S INSOLVENCY LAW 253 (9th ed. 2012).
73. Smits, supra note 53, at 82.
74. DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUS., THE COMPANIES ACT NO. 71 OF 2008: EXPLANATORY
GUIDE REPLACING THE COMPANIES ACT, NO. 61 OF 1973 6 (2010), https://cdn.ymaws.com/
www.iodsa.co.za/resource/collection/CB7E5DC1-E790-4BED-9693-9F8AA33E0032/
Companies_Act_Guide.pdf [hereinafter EXPLANATORY GUIDE].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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and promote SME development. The replacement legislation was adopted to
promote the empowerment and growth of companies of all sizes, including
SME companies. As explained below, this means that corporate rescue strategies provided for in the form of business rescue will apply to South African
SMEs incorporated under the Act, provided that they have complied with the
requirements set out in the new legislation and its regulations. 78
III. BUSINESS RESCUE UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT OF 2008
In line with the objective of the Department of Trade and Industry, 79
business rescue entirely replaces judicial management as South Africa’s
corporate reorganization procedure. In the “new” Companies Act of 2008,
the introduction of business rescue was in line with the objective of the
Companies Act of 2008 by aiming to ensure the effective relief and recovery
of financially distressed companies in a manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders. 80 The following section of this Comment
outlines the workings of business rescue as a corporate reorganization procedure for financially distressed enterprises under the Companies Act of 2008.
A. The Definition and Purpose of Business Rescue
The term “business rescue” is defined in Section 128(1)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008. 81 Business rescue refers to proceedings aimed at assisting in
the rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed by providing for the
temporary supervision of the company by a freestanding business rescue practitioner. 82 The business rescue practitioner will help develop and implement a
business rescue plan to restructure the company and achieve the plan’s objectives. 83 In view of the fact that South African SMEs have the lowest survival
rate in the world, 84 business rescue provides SMEs in financial distress with the
opportunity to reorganize themselves by appointing an independent business
rescue practitioner who will assist them in developing useful and efficient turnaround strategies to improve their chance of survival and enable them to function
efficiently as a going concern.
Additionally, the appointment of a business rescue practitioner achieves one
of the following business rescue objectives: to give an SME in financial distress

78. See Companies Regulations of 2011 (S. Afr.).
79. EXPLANATORY GUIDE, supra note 74.
80. Id.
81. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(b) (S. Afr.).
82. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(d) (S. Afr.) (defining a business rescue practitioner
as a person, or two or more persons, appointed to oversee a firm during business rescue proceedings).
83. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 150 (S. Afr.).
84. LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 7.
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the opportunity to continue to exist on a solvent basis by providing reorganization services. 85 However, where this objective proves impossible to achieve,
the business rescue practitioner assists the SME in obtaining a better return for
the company’s creditors and shareholders than if SME was liquidated. 86 The
achievement of the first objective by the business rescue practitioner is thus of
paramount importance to the survival and overall sustainability of enterprises of
all sizes, including SMEs. 87
B. Elements of Application for Business Rescue Proceedings
The Companies Act of 2008 provides for some requirements that must be
fulfilled before a company is placed under business rescue under Chapter 6.
The company must satisfy two elements: (1) the company must be in financial
distress, and (2) there must be a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company.
The first element for determining whether a company should be placed under business rescue is whether the company is in “financial distress.” 88 The
Companies Act of 2008 defines what constitutes a financially distressed company for the purposes of business rescue. A company will be financially distressed if at any specific time “it appears to be reasonably unlikely that the
company will be able to pay all of its debts as they fall due and payable within
the immediately ensuing six months,” or “it appears to be reasonably likely that
the company will become insolvent within the immediately ensuing six
months.” 89 Again, the failure rate of SMEs in South Africa is one of the highest
in the world. 90 Most SMEs appear to be in financial distress within their first
year of incorporation. Loubser argues that broadening the definition of “financial distress” to include circumstances in which a company anticipates financial
distress will, in turn, clarify the situation and allow for the affected people to
receive the appropriate information to commence the procedure within a reasonable period. 91 This is a good recommendation for SMEs, as it would provide them with greater opportunity to invoke business rescue proceedings at an
earlier stage.
Furthermore, since South African SMEs have the lowest survival rate in the
world, 92 it is of supreme importance to initiate business rescue proceedings at
85. “Solvent basis” refers to a position in which the firm will have sufficient capacity to pay
its debts.
86. Richard S. Bradstreet, Averting Liquidations with Business Rescue: Does a Section 155
Compromise Place the Bar Too High?, 25 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 549, 550 (2014).
87. Id.
88. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128 (1)(f) (S. Afr.); ERIC LEVENSTEIN & LAUREN
BARNETT, BASICS OF BUSINESS RESCUE (2013), httfp://www.werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/
2013/04/Werksmans-Basics-of-Business-Rescue1.pdf.
89. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(f) (S. Afr.).
90. LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 7.
91. Loubser Thesis, supra note 60, at 34.
92. LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 7; Loubser Thesis, supra note 60, at 29.
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the earliest sign of financial distress. 93 A point often overlooked in the current
business rescue regime is that SMEs are survivalist in nature, and thus any form
of distress should warrant the application of business rescue proceedings. 94
This would be in line with the recommendations made by Rajak & Henning,
who envisioned a much more lenient approach to business rescue for small enterprises. 95 Inherently viable and healthy SMEs may experience unforeseen and
provisional cash-flow problems, possibly caused by external factors such as an
earthquake, a factory fire, a failure of an important supplier, political unrest, or
employee strikes. 96 These factors can ultimately place survivalist SMEs in distress and justify the immediate application of business rescue proceedings.
Loubser argues that an enterprise should be allowed to enter business rescue
proceedings at the first sign of financial distress. 97 If an enterprise waits until it
can prove its insolvency and inability to pay its debts, the chances of a successful SME rescue are significantly weakened. 98
Moreover, for SMEs to be successful in business rescue, any form of distress, whether “financial distress” or “economic distress,” should qualify a
company for business rescue. 99 For example, when an SME is solving employee disputes or dealing with insurance companies after a natural disaster takes
place that wholly or partially destroys its premises, it would be unable to make
use of business rescue proceedings unless it is in financial distress. In light of
the above, it would be best if SMEs could apply for business rescue proceedings
at the earliest stage when it shows signs of distress, both economic and financial. Loubser recommends that a company’s present insolvency or inability to
pay its debts should constitute financial distress for business rescue. 100 It is further submitted in agreement with Loubser’s recommendation that the adoption
of such a proposal would increase the likelihood of a successful business rescue
for SMEs in South Africa. The sooner a rescue procedure is initiated, the higher the chances of its success. 101
The second element under the Companies Act of 2008 provides a less stringent requirement than that of judicial management, which requires that the
company would probably become a successful going concern. 102 Section
129(1)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008 now requires only that the board
should have reasonable ground to believe there is a reasonable prospect of res-

Loubser Thesis, supra note 60, at 57.
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 129.
Rajak & Henning, supra note 62, at 263.
Id.; see generally Loubser, supra note 49.
Loubser, supra note 49, at 57.
Id. at 57.
See GERARD MCCORMACK, CORPORATE RESCUE LAW—AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVE 9 (2008).
100. Loubser, supra note 49, at 57.
101. Id.
102. Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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cuing the company. 103 Loubser, 104 however, emphasizes that the use of the
word “prospect” creates unnecessary confusion. Loubser suggests that the
drafters should have used either a “possibility” or a “probability” in place of the
word “prospect.” A clear distinction would have made it clear when SMEs can
make use of business rescue proceedings. In the name of creating a more lenient approach for SMEs, the use of the word “possibility” instead of “prospect”
should be used to create a more appropriate corporate rescue procedure for distressed SMEs.
C. Persons with Power to Initiate Business Rescue Proceedings
There are two main ways by which companies in financial distress can initiate business rescue proceedings: either the company itself initiates via board
resolution or an affected person does so by court application. 105 A court may
place the enterprise under supervision and commence business rescue proceedings if it is satisfied that the company is financially distressed and that there is a
reasonable prospect of its rescue. 106 This gives SMEs the power to reorganize
voluntarily and choose a business rescue practitioner. 107 This is an excellent
addition to our corporate rescue system, as it allows the company to choose the
business rescue practitioner best suited for its size industry. This suggests that
it would be in the best interests of SMEs if unalterable business rescue provisions were regularly included in their Memoranda of Incorporation. Such a
provision could state that once a company shows any sign of financial distress,
it must be placed under business rescue. This would be useful in improving the
survival rates of South African SMEs, which are characterized by high levels of
failure. 108
1. Affected Persons
An affected person can initiate business rescue proceedings by filing a business rescue resolution with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission and avoid going to the courts. Section 128(1)(a) of the Companies Act of
2008 considers an affected person to include “a shareholder or creditor of the
company in financial distress, a registered trade union representing the employees of the company, as well as the employees in general who do not belong to a
registered trade union.” 109 Although scholars have viewed this approach as cre-

103. Id. The board refers to the board of the directors of the firm comprising directors and
other relevant members.
104. Id. at 78.
105. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 131(4)(a) (S. Afr.).
106. Id.
107. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 129(1)(b) (S. Afr.).
108. LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 7.
109. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(a) (S. Afr.).
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ating a system that could lead to abuse, it provides SMEs in financial distress
with a full opportunity to make use of business rescue proceedings by including
employees, directors, and other affected persons in the process. 110 In this respect, the commencement of business rescue proceedings by affected persons
who do not have access to the company’s internal documents could appear burdensome for SMEs applying for business rescue. However, Section 31(3) of the
Companies Act of 2008 makes this additional access more useful to shareholders who are not directors of the company by allowing trade union representatives to access to the company’s financial records for the purpose of business
rescue. This is done through the Companies Intellectual Property Commission
(“CIPC”) and subject to the conditions that the Commission may determine. 111
2. The Business Rescue Practitioner
Section 138(1) of the Companies Act of 2008 sets out the requirements for
the appointment of a business rescue practitioner. 112 It requires that the business rescue practitioner be selected from the ranks of good standing members of
the legal, accounting, or business management profession. 113 Given the fact
that South Africa has between 2 to 6 million SMEs, and 20 percent of these
SMEs are registered with the CIPC, 114 it would be in the best interest of SMEs
if the appointment of a business rescue practitioner were not solely based on academic merit and experience but rather on special skills and experience with
that particular form of SME. A business rescue practitioner should be accompanied by an SME expert with practical knowledge and experience in the SME
sector. A business rescue practitioner has the power to delegate his or her powers and functions to any other person who was part of the board or management
of the Company in financial distress as well as to appoint any other person as

110. George M. Museta, The Development of Business Rescue in South African Law 66
(Nov. 2011) (unpublished L.L.M. dissertation, University of Pretoria).
111. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 31(3) (S. Afr.). When the Companies Act of 2008 came
into effect on May 1, 2011, the Companies Intellectual Property Commission (“CIPC”) was created
from the merger of Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (“CIPRO”) and the
Office of Firm and Intellectual Property Enforcement (“OCIPE”). Its function is to cater to the registration of companies, co-operatives, and intellectual property rights (trademarks, patents, designs
and copyright) and maintenance thereof; to disclose information on its business registers; to promote education and awareness of firm and intellectual property law; to promote compliance with
relevant legislation; efficiently and effectively enforce relevant legislation; to monitor compliance
with and violations of financial reporting standards and make recommendations thereto to the Financial Reporting Standards Council (“FRSC”); to facilitate the licensing of business rescue practitioners; and to report, research, and advise the Minister on matters of national policy relating to firm
and intellectual property law. See generally COS. & INTELL. PROP. COMM’N, http://www.cipc.co.za/
za/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
112. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 138(1) (S. Afr.).
113. Id.
114. LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 9.
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part of the management of the company. 115 It is in the best interest of SMEs for
business rescue practitioners to be SME experts. The discretion of the business
rescue practitioner to delegate or appoint other experts can only lead to an increase in the overall costs of the business rescue process.
Another challenge faced by SMEs in the current South African corporate
rescue procedure is that most business rescue practitioners are inadequately
regulated under the Companies Act of 2008. The Companies Act of 2008 provides that the practitioner “may delegate any power or function of the practitioner to a person who was part of the board or pre-existing management of the
company.” The practitioner may also remove such persons from office, and in
the same fashion, the practitioner may appoint a person as part of the management of the company. 116 Even though the pre-existing management of a distressed company remains in place, it is the practitioner who has ultimate control
once a company is placed under business rescue. 117 And he or she can control
the company in any manner they deem fit. 118 Such a broad grant of power to
the practitioner may be counterproductive. When control is diverted from the
people involved in the day-to-day management of the company, 119 they may
lose motivation to help it become profitable again. On the other hand, the broad
power of business rescue practitioners could lead to successful SME reorganizations. For example, the business rescue practitioner can remove uncooperative
or inefficient managers without the pressure of family ties within the SME.
The Companies Regulations of 2011 outline the remuneration tariffs and
fees for business rescue practitioners. 120 Most SMEs cannot afford the services
of a business rescue practitioner because of the tariff standards set out in the
regulations. A business rescue practitioner can be rewarded with the following
schemes: at a maximum rate of $88 per hour to a maximum amount of
$1,110.97 per day (inclusive of Value Added Tax (“VAT”)) in the case of a
small company; at a maximum rate of $106.65 per hour, to a maximum amount
of $1,333.16 per day (inclusive of VAT) in the case of a medium-sized company; and at a maximum rate of $142.20 per hour, to a maximum amount of
$1,777.55 per day (inclusive of VAT) in the case of a large or a state-owned
company. 121 The tariffs set out in the Companies Regulations are problematic
for survivalist SMEs, which in times of financial distress can have a turnover of
less than $ 1,130 per month. These remuneration tariffs alone make business
rescue out of reach for most SMEs. Consequently, otherwise salvageable and
useful corporate entities fail because they cannot afford business rescue. Also,

115. Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 140(1)(b), (c)(ii) (S. Afr.).
116. Id. §§ 140 (1)(c)(i)–(ii).
117. Id. § 140 (1)(a).
118. Id. §§ 140 (1)(a)–(c).
119. Id.
120. Companies Regulations of 2011 (S. Afr.).
121. Id. §§ 128(1)(a)–(c). Monetary amounts were converted from South African Rand to
United States Dollar amounts on November 20, 2018.
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the Companies Regulations do not restrict any “further remuneration” for a
business rescue practitioner. 122 This means that the business rescue practitioner
can charge a higher fee than that stipulated in the Companies Regulations—
ultimately making the process even less accessible to SMEs. Even the least experienced practitioner will cost the same amount because the tariffs are based
on the size of the corporate entity rather than merit.
D. Evaluating Business Rescue
1. Exclusive Rights Granted to Employees and an
Automatic Moratorium on SME Creditors
Business rescue provides an excellent advantage to employees of SMEs because it allows for fair and equitable treatment of employees when the SME is
financially distressed. 123 Business rescue offers the employees protection and
considerable benefits during the business rescue process: employment contracts
are specifically excluded from a business rescue practitioner’s power to render
void or suspend contracts during the business rescue process. 124 Employees of
financially distressed SMEs are given individual preference rights with respect
to remuneration. 125 Section 135(1) of the Companies Regulations classifies any
“remuneration, reimbursements” 126 or other payments due and payable by the
company to its employees during business rescue proceedings as postcommencement finance. 127 These claims are afforded special preference rights,
and they are ranked after the costs of the business rescue proceedings and the
business rescue practitioner’s fee and costs, but before any claims for other
forms of post-commencement finance. 128
It is estimated that 91 percent of formal business entities in South Africa are
SMEs, and these SMEs contribute between 52 and 57 percent of South Africa’s
GDP and 61 percent of employment. 129 Business rescue ensures that the employment provided by SMEs is protected while also promoting the development
and maintenance of the standard of living of the community within which the
SMEs operate. If one compares the rights of employees of an SME that is immediately liquidated to one which is placed under business rescue, the benefits
to employees from SMEs using business rescue proceedings as a restructuring
procedure become abundantly clear. When an SME is placed under liquidation

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 143(2)–(4) (S. Afr.).
FAROUK H.I. CASSIM ET AL., CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW 537 (2d ed. 2012).
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 136 (S. Afr.).
Id. §§ 133, 135.
Id. § 133(1).
Id. §§ 133, 135.
Id.
LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 7.
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via Section 38(1) of the 1936 Insolvency Act, 130 the liquidation suspends all
employee contracts of service from the date on which an order of winding up is
issued. 131
The special rights granted to employees under the Companies Act of 2008,
therefore, present an opportunity to earn remuneration for a few extra months if
the business shuts down. Additionally, the Companies Act of 2008 protects the
company against breach of contract actions, by conferring rights to the business
rescue practitioner. These include the right to suspend—whether entirely, partially, or conditionally—any obligation that the SME is party to at the commencement of business rescue proceedings. 132 This helps prevent additional
actions against the SME for breach of contract based on non-performance of the
SME’s contractual obligations. 133 The suspension of obligations endures until
business rescue proceedings are concluded. 134
Furthermore, the business rescue practitioner is given the right to make an
urgent application to the court to “cancel or suspend entirely, partially or conditionally” 135 a clause of any non-employment contract on behalf of an SME. 136
This right creates a contract moratorium that gives an SME breathing space to
reorganize itself and develop new strategies to overcome the threat of liquidation. Moreover, providing the practitioner with the right to suspend contractual
obligations helps the SME reflect on the cause its financial distress. It can also
help temporarily release the SME from bad investments that led to financial distress.
Nevertheless, the rights given to a business rescue practitioner should be
exercised with caution, as they may void established contracts that could contribute to the SME’s growth. For example, if the practitioner suspends the contract with a vital supplier, the SME may be unable to operate fruitfully as a going concern if the supplier is not lenient and understanding of the business
rescue process. The possibility for the SME to contract under the same terms
with the critical supplier would be significantly reduced. In conclusion, the
main advantage to SMEs of business rescue is the provision of moratoriums in
both legal proceedings and contract; these moratoriums allow the business rescue practitioner to focus on rescuing the company by developing a proposal and
implementing turnaround strategies without the burden of impending legal actions and possible liquidation proceedings. 137

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 § 38 (S. Afr.).
Id. § 38(1).
Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 136(2)–(2A) (S. Afr.).
Loubser, supra note 49, at 87.
CASSIM ET AL., supra note 123, at 886.
Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 136(2)–(2A) (S. Afr.).
Id.
Bradstreet, supra note 86, at 562.
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2. The Problem of Post-Commencement Finance for SMEs
Most SMEs have difficulty with securing initial funding. 138 As a result,
they rely on personal savings, friends, and family members; 139 during their
growth phase, they then venture into the realm of asset-backed finance and bank
debts. 140 Financial lending institutions are often reluctant to finance SMEs because most do not have enough assets to offer as security at the time of incorporation. 141
Financing is no easier after incorporation, even as post-commencement finance is one of the most important aspects of business rescue. 142 Companies
that are placed under the supervision of an independent business rescue practitioner do not have the assets or cash to fund regular business activities during
the rescue process. 143 The biggest obstacle to successful reorganization is the
challenge of accessing capital for business through financial institutions. 144
Section 135(2) of the Companies Act of 2008 provides that “the company
may obtain financing [that is not unrelated to the employment,” which “may be
secured to the lender by utilising any [unencumbered] assets of the company,”
and “will be paid in the order of preference set out in subsection 135(3)(b).” 145
Yet Pretorius & Du Preez 146 suggest that the availability of post-commencement
finance in South Arica is practically non-existent. Post-commencement finance
requires creditors, banks, and financiers to provide credit support for companies
in financial distress. 147 Most creditors, banks, and financiers, however, are reluctant to finance a company that is in financial distress and undergoing business rescue proceedings. 148 The chances of a successful reorganization procedure for SMEs are reduced where the magnitude and nature of the funding
required for rescuing the SME exceeds the total value and assets of the SME.
Ultimately, the successful reorganization of such SMEs through business rescue
will depend on the possibility of securing a financier with an appetite for significant risk. Furthermore, typical financiers of post-commencement finance
would want to conduct investigations to establish their confidence in the future

138. See LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 8.
139. Id. at 62.
140. Id. at 33.
141. Id. at 62.
142. CASSIM ET AL., supra note 123, at 882.
143. Id.
144. LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 32.
145. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 135 (S. Afr.).
146. Marius Pretorius & Wanya Du Preez, Constraints on Decision Making Regarding PostCommencement Finance in Business Rescue, 6 S. AFR. J. ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SMALL BUS.
MGMT. 168, 169 (2013).
147. CASSIM ET AL., supra note 123, at 882.
148. Id.
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viability of the company under reorganization. 149 This poses major concerns to
SMEs in financial distress because the ability to successfully raise postcommencement finance can determine whether the business rescue is successful. 150
It would be in the best interests of SMEs if the Companies Act of 2008 prescribed that small and medium companies can appoint both an experienced and
junior business rescue practitioner to improve the chances of securing postcommencement finance. Pretorius & Du Preez recommend that two experienced and competent business rescue practitioners, with their collaborative networks and thorough knowledge and understanding of the business rescue process and industry, are much more effective in securing post-commencement
finance. 151 Although this may be true, appointing two business rescue practitioners could pose a problem for survivalist SMEs, which already cannot afford
the tariffs of one business rescue practitioner.
E. Informal Alternatives
Section 155 of Companies Act of 2008 provides for a settlement agreement
between a company and its creditors. This compromise is entered as an alternative to business rescue proceedings. This means that an SME can use the compromise between a company and its creditor’s provision as a substitute to business rescue to restructure a company in financial distress. 152 However, it is imimportant to note that a compromise cannot be used by an SME that is already
engaged in business rescue proceedings. When an SME enters into a compromise, its board of directors or the liquidator will bind itself in some form of
agreement to arrange for a settlement or any other form of arrangement made
between the SME and its creditors that terminates the dispute. A compromise
will be appropriate for SMEs when the process of placing a company under
business rescue is unattainable.
For an SME to make use of a compromise with creditors as a reorganization
strategy, it need not necessarily be in financial distress. Section 155(1) of the
Companies Act of 2008 states that a company may enter into a compromise between its creditors “irrespective of whether or not [the company] is financially
distressed.” 153 This means that an SME will have the benefit of making use of
the process before the creditors learn of the SME’s inability to pay its debts
when they become due and payable. Allowing SMEs to make use of the process without necessarily being in a state of financial distress helps maintain

149. Pretorius & Du Preez, supra note 146, at 174. Typical financiers include banks, creditors, and shareholders.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 186.
152. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 155(1) (S. Afr.).
153. Id.
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their financial reputation and improves their chances of securing finance from
commercial banking institutions. 154
A compromise between a company and its creditors does not involve the
use of a business rescue practitioner, who would normally investigate the debtor’s affairs and offer turnaround strategies to save the company in distress by
developing a business rescue plan and consulting with affected persons. 155 This
means that the SMEs that make use of this reorganization method must develop
a business rescue plan. Moreover, an SME that makes use of this benefit will
profit from developing experience in administration and improving the skills of
board members who will assist in drafting a business rescue plan with turnaround experts. The business rescue plan, once completed, will be used at the
creditors’ meetings once the creditors have approved the plan. 156
Furthermore, because the compromise with creditors does not require the
services of a business rescue practitioner, the SME will not bear the practitioner’s high fees. 157 It can thus be argued that the compromise is likely to benefit
SMEs by reducing costs, as they will not need the practitioner’s services to assist in drawing a business rescue plan and restructuring the company.
The board of the company or the liquidator of the company has the power to
put forward an arrangement with respect to “its financial obligations to all of its
creditors, or to all of the members of any class of its creditors, by delivering a
copy of the proposal, and notice of a meeting to consider the proposal,” 158 to the
creditors known to the company. 159 Significantly, this procedure enables an
SME to draft a proposal to its creditors without incurring any administrative
costs of the application to convene meetings with its creditors. 160 A company
that makes use of a Section 155 compromise will incur only the costs of turning
the compromise into a court ruling for it to be binding. 161 Saving costs while
attempting to restructure a company of any size is crucial in ensuring that the
company saves funds to be used contingently in its future growth or recapitalisation.
Business rescue proceedings provide an advantage to SMEs in the form of a
moratorium on any legal proceedings against the SME in financial distress. 162
This moratorium provides that “no legal proceeding, including [an] enforcement
action” 163 will take place against the SME “or in relation to any property be-

154. Id.
155. Bradstreet, supra note 86, at 558.
156. Id.
157. Companies Regulations 2011 § 128 (S. Afr.).
158. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 155(2) (S. Afr.).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. This procedure is less administrative, as there are fewer costs associated with making a
court application and pursuing a highly procedural reorganization process.
162. Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 133(1).
163. Id.
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longing to the [SME], or lawfully in its possession, may be commenced or proceeded with in any forum.” 164 This moratorium benefits SMEs in financial distress by providing breathing space. The effect of the Section 133(1) moratorium is that it automatically stays legal proceedings against the SME, and
execution and enforcement actions issued by the SMEs’ creditors may not be
initiated except with both the written consent of the practitioner and with leave
of the court. 165 A business rescue plan must be developed after the business
rescue practitioner has initiated his or her preliminary investigation. This has
the effect of providing for a moratorium with respect to actions against the
company and actions concerning the company’s ownership until payment can
eventually be made from the future earnings of the company, or until the SME
secures the post-commencement financing which will be used to settle some of
its debts. In both these events, the SME will not immediately enter liquidation,
and this will spare the plant machinery belonging to the SME that is attached by
the sheriff for sale by way of a public auction. This helps the SME to raise
funds and avoid liquidation during in the rescue process. Staying these proceedings creates an opportunity to attempt a corporate rescue strategy that could
allow the SME to continue trading regardless of whether there is legal action
pending against it and regardless of whether some or all the SME’s property has
been attached by the sheriff. This moratorium is not provided for when a company enters a compromise with its creditors. Although business rescue has provided useful turnaround strategies for companies in financial distress, it does
not necessarily provide for reorganization strategies that can be effectively used
by SMEs. It is therefore important that South Africa comparatively looks at innovative ways to which SMEs can be effectively reorganized under Chapter 11
of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
III. CHAPTER 11 OF THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE
In the United States, the law on corporate reorganization is confined to
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 166 The Bankruptcy Code has
adopted a “pro-debtor” rather than a “pro-creditor” approach to the corporate
reorganization of companies. 167 Due to Chapter 11’s success in the United
States, many countries view it as the standard for corporate reorganization, with
the potential to facilitate corporate insolvency reforms successfully. 168 The
2004 policy document of the Department of Trade and Industry, for example,
stipulates that “in order to create a system of corporate rescue appropriate to the
needs of a modern South African economy,” the provisions of the of the United

164. Id.
165. Id. §§ 133(1)(a)–(b).
166. MCCORMACK, supra note 99, at 78.
167. Id.
168. Anneli Loubser, Tilting at Windmills? The Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African Law, 25 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L.J. 437, 439 (2013).
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States Bankruptcy Code are considered as part of South Africa’s recognition of
international law. 169 Chapter 11 is commonly used when major corporations,
like Ford, General Motors, K–Mart, or United Airlines are in financial distress. 170 These large corporations are the most likely to turn to Chapter 11 and
the bankruptcy courts for corporate reorganization solutions as opposed to other
methods of reorganization (such as private agreements with creditors). However, the most common cases filed by businesses and companies in the bankruptcy
court courts are far from being globally listed or Wall Street titleholders and
household names. 171
Under Chapter 11, a company can restructure its finances using a reorganization plan, which must be approved by the bankruptcy court. A Chapter 11
bankruptcy plan can help reduce obligations and modify payment terms between the debtor company and its creditors. A reorganization plan is traditionally used for larger companies; smaller companies do not usually reach the
stage of making a reorganization plan, as their cases are either dismissed or
converted into Chapter 7 liquidations. 172 The confirmation of a reorganization
plan by the court discharges a corporate debtor from fulfilling all legal obligations not included in the reorganization plan. 173 For the most part, SMEs in the
United States must follow the same rules and requirements as bigger corporations when they make use of reorganization strategies under Chapter 11. 174
There are, however, some special provisions for SME debtors that can help to
accelerate the process of Chapter 11 by reducing legal and other reorganization
expenditures. These are discussed below.
First, under the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 11 proceeding filed by a “small
business debtor” is categorized as a “small business case.” 175 A “small business
debtor” is a person or entity who: (1) is engaged in business or other commercial activities and (2) owes no more than $2,490,925 in total claims. 176 In creating an SME-friendly corporate reorganization strategy for South Africa, categorizing the size of the business in terms of the total amount of creditor claims can
reduce legal expenses and other costs incidental to business rescue. An appropriate turnaround strategy for such a company would be one appropriate for a
“small business debtor” and would be administered on a “small business” scale

169. DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS. OF S. AFR., SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 45 (2004).
170. CARA O’NEILL, CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY FOR SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS, https://
www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/chapter-11-bankruptcy-small-business-owners.html (last visited
Nov. 28, 2018).
171. Id.
172. MCCORMACK, supra note 99, at 86.
173. Id.
174. O’NEILL, supra note 170.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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within the context and meaning of Chapter 11. 177 In the context of South Africa, it is recommended that the size of the debt should also have an influence in
determining the costs and remuneration package of a business rescue practitioner, as well as the choice of appointing either a junior, senior, or experienced
practitioner as defined by the Companies Regulations. 178 This addition, if correctly implemented, would help create a more accommodating environment for
SMEs in South Africa.
Second, in Chapter 11 cases, a committee is appointed to represent the interests of unsecured creditors of the ailing company. 179 This committee can retain the services of an attorney, an investment banker, an auditor, and other related professionals at debtor’s expense. 180 However, these services can
significantly increase the costs of reorganization, making the process inaccessible for “small business debtors.” 181 To cure this, Chapter 11 has provided a
special provision for “small business debtors” by giving the bankruptcy court
the power to order that no creditors’ committee is appointed. 182
In South Africa, business rescue proceedings cannot take place without the
appointment of an independent professionally accredited person from good
standing legal, accounting, or business management positions. 183 Often, such a
requirement makes the process more burdensome for South African SMEs because most experienced “good standing professionally accredited professionals”
come with their own designated consultation fees and other related administration charges. To reduce this effect, the Companies Regulations 184 set out the
prescribed tariff fees for such professionally accredited persons according to the
size of the corporate entity in distress. To remedy this, the legislature should
follow the benchmark set by Chapter 11 which makes the appointment of a professionally accredited body of person(s) subject to the discretion of the bankruptcy court. In other words, such appointment of a business rescue practitioner
should be optional and reserved for the discretion of the court or the SME itself
in order to reduce costs and make the procedure more accessible. SMEs in
South Africa can also achieve the same effect if the board makes an application
to the Commission without court oversight. This has the effect of reducing the
costs of the business rescue.
Third, Chapter 11 subjects “small business debtors” to additional reporting
and filing requirements that are not imposed on other Chapter 11 debtors: a
“small business debtor” must attach its most recently organized balance sheet,
statement of operations, cash flow statement and federal tax return of its petition
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Companies Regulations of 2011 §§ 127(2)(c), 128(1) (S. Afr.).
O’NEILL, supra note 170.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 138 (S. Afr.).
See Companies Regulations of 2011 § 128 (S. Afr.).
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when it files for Chapter 11 relief. 185 In the South African context, if the SME
in financial distress passes a resolution, business rescue commences. The SME
will only have to file a copy of the decision with the CIPC for publicity purposes. There is nothing else to be filed with the court because in South Africa the
Companies Regulations allows access entirely extra-judicially. This benefits
South African SMEs, as it provides a more straightforward procedure for restructuring by reducing the administration process of filling for business rescue.
Fourth, the United States Trustee’s Office is the agency responsible for
overseeing bankruptcy cases on behalf of the Department of Justice. Notably,
Chapter 11 confers additional trustee oversight to the United States Trustee’s
Office for “small business debtors” more than any other Chapter 11 proceedings. 186 In South Africa, imposing a duty on the Companies and Intellectual
Property Commission as well as the Companies’ Tribunal 187 would aid in overseeing the reorganization process for SMEs and prevent possible abuses by the
business rescue practitioner or any other person involved in the reorganization
process. Furthermore, SMEs are sensitive entities that are usually formed by
the individual savings of the incorporators, government funding, and, in more
charitable circumstances, the commercial banking sector. 188 This warrant having an independent statutory body to oversee and audit the entire reorganization
process for SMEs. This would set the tone for transparency and accountability
of business rescue practitioners during the reorganization process for enterprises
of all sizes. Moreover, the additional oversight will protect the needs and interests of the stakeholders, since the powers and duties of the directors of the ailing
SME are confined in the business rescue practitioner. 189
Fifth, the general rules applicable in filing for a Chapter 11 plan set by the
bankruptcy court prescribe no deadline for filing a Chapter 11 plan, unless such
a plan deadline is set by the court. 190 However, “small business debtors” are
given only 300 days to put forward a Chapter 11 plan subject to extension at the
bankruptcy court’s discretion. 191 In South Africa, the business rescue practitioner, once appointed, has the duty of drafting and preparing a business rescue
plan, which he or she must propose to the creditors for approval; he or she may
also present the plan to management and other affected persons as well. 192 Any
proposal that the business rescue plan for South African SME companies should
be given 300 days to file a business rescue plan could be tantamount to placing
the SME in liquidation and performing commercial homicide. The current
business rescue regime in South Africa requires business rescue practitioners to
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
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draft, prepare, and publish a business rescue plan within 25 days of their appointment. 193 Extending the plan deadline from 25 days to 300 days granted at
the court’s discretion would be useful in giving the business rescue practitioner
enough time to convene a meeting with the creditors of the SME and any other
affected persons to carefully consider the business rescue plan before filing. 194
Chapter 11 goes further to create a more fertile environment for “small
business debtors” by providing for longer exclusive periods to propose a reorganization plan. 195 Chapter 11 gives the debtor an exclusive right of 120 days
after it files for bankruptcy to propose a reorganization plan. However, “small
business debtors” are given an exclusive extension period of 180 days to propose a rescue plan. The justification underlying this exclusive special provision
is to reduce the risk to a “small business debtor” of having to litigate competing
plans and potentially losing its business. South Africa does not provide for this
extension period, which can be valuable for SMEs, as it can provide SMEs with
an extended amount of time to draft the business rescue plan.
Finally, Chapter 11 generally requires the debtor to prepare a disclosure
statement and submit it to the bankruptcy court for approval. Once the statement is approved, the debtor must then circulate copies to creditors and other
parties or interested persons. 196 These disclosure statements, in accordance with
Chapter 11, must provide extensive information about the debtor and proposed
plan. 197 Chapter 11 reduces the cost to “small business debtors” of securing a
disclosure statement by giving the bankruptcy court discretion to waive the requirement. 198 If the bankruptcy court grants such a waiver to “small business
debtors,” the legal and other costs associated with reorganizing the company are
significantly reduced. 199 Distressed SMEs in South Africa would benefit significantly if the courts were given the discretion to waive the requirement of documents related to the reorganization process. Alternatively, the costs saved
from such a waiver can be invested towards the repayment of preferred and other related creditors or possibly assist in the overall administration costs associated with the reorganization of the company.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 11 has adopted useful strategies to facilitate an accommodative reorganization environment for SMEs within their corporate reorganization model. The United States has identified the sensitivity of SMEs and established
suitable mechanisms to promote the successful reorganization of SME compa-
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nies within their respective jurisdictions. South Africa could refine the current
business rescue model to make it more accommodative to SMEs by either designating compromises between a company and its creditors to SMEs, or by introducing an automatic moratorium for such companies during the corporate
rescue process. Alternatively, South Africa could adopt the approach of Chapter 11, which reduces the administrative costs of Chapter 6. South Africa could
also give the same special treatment to SMEs as Chapter 11 provides for “small
business” SME cases. But a significant problem with following the United
States approach is that there is no mechanism provided for court oversight in
Chapter 11. This lack of oversight creates an environment for substantial abuse
throughout the process by all affected persons including the business rescue
practitioner, the creditors, and the debtors of the financially distressed company.
SMEs form the lifeblood of socio-economic development in South Africa,
providing much-needed employment opportunities and training support and developing worker skills both formally and informally. Fortunately, the government of South Africa recognizes how essential SMEs are in reforming South
Africa’s corporate sector to provide equal opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons. Moreover, using SMEs to implement Broad Based Black
Economic Empowerment strategies helps to promote the radical approach of
including historically disadvantaged persons both socially and economically in
the commercial sector. However, despite such recognition by government and
other key players in the commercial sector, SME failure and survival rates in
South Africa remain the worst in the world. The failure rate of SMEs stresses
the need for a corporate rescue system that accommodates the requirements,
structure, and sensitivity of SMEs which are primarily characterized as survivalist in nature. A reformative corporate rescue system is therefore essential for
the survival of SMEs in financial and economic distress.
It is well known that judicial management was a failure for South African
businesses in need of corporate restructuring. Judicial management did not
provide realistic and practical rescue solutions for SMEs. The procedure was
highly regulated, inaccessible, and hardly used by companies in financial difficulty. Its structure and application made it cumbersome and unfeasible for
SMEs to attempt a corporate rescue process. The expense of the procedure as
well as the lack of adequate regulation of the administrator—now known as a
business rescue practitioner— contributed to the inherent difficulty of the procedure. Thus, the best alternative for distressed SMEs was not to attempt to
salvage the business but rather to opt for liquidation and divide the residual
amongst the shareholders.
The South African Department of Trade and Industry saw a need to promote
the international competitiveness of South African businesses by introducing a
reformed corporate rescue process in the form of business rescue. Business rescue, as introduced in Chapter 6 of the Companies Act of 2008, seeks to provide
a reformed approach to reorganizing South African companies in financial distress by offering them breathing space in the form of moratoriums. These enable a company in financial distress to adequately restructure itself, save jobs,
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and attempt a turnaround strategy that will allow the business to recover and
yield a better return for the creditors than liquidation. Business rescue succeeded in providing more advantages to companies in need of corporate reorganization strategies than judicial management as legislated in the Companies Act
1973. Despite this apparent far-reaching change, business rescue remains a
cumbersome process for SMEs in financial distress, which still need the benefit
and protection of business rescue.
Although the legislature has tried to keep abreast with international trends
in providing a modernized form of corporate rescue analogous to that of the
Anglo-American countries, it has failed dismally in providing South Africa with
a corporate rescue system suitable to the needs and development of South African companies. The current business rescue process has an inherent teething
problem that makes it cumbersome for SMEs to use. The legislature should
have acknowledged the fact that companies in the United States—a developed
country—could not be rescued identically to companies in South Africa—a developing country. A shift by the legislature from a more formal to an informal
procedure tailor-made for South African companies, most importantly SMEs,
could be much more successful. Our current business rescue system needs a
serious facelift that will make it more practical and efficient for SMEs.
The formally regulated procedure inherent in business rescue that requires
the services of high-paid personnel—business rescue practitioners who are often
selected from the ranks of legal practitioners and business experts—renders the
process burdensome for SMEs. Because SMEs are sensitive and survivalist in
nature, they require seasoned SME experts to develop their turnaround strategy.
The one-size-fits-all approach of business rescue is thus not favorable for saving
SMEs with a monthly turnover equivalent to the daily prescribed fees of a business rescue practitioner. Moreover, the financial distress requirement is limiting, in that businesses do not fail only due to financial distress but also through
economic distress that involves the failure of the business plan. Had the legislature made use of the recommendations made by Rajak & Henning, who envisioned a dual system form of business rescue—one that takes cognizance of the
contribution of small companies in our economy—the current difficulties could
have been avoided.
Alternatively, the Companies Act of 2008 also provides for business rescue
by way of a compromise between the company and its creditors. Directors or
members of the companies may negotiate an approach to reorganizing the company through compromise between the creditors and the directors of the company at creditors’ meetings. The compromise provides the members or directors
of the company with an opportunity to restructure the company, regardless of
whether the company is in financial distress. A further advantage is that this
compromise does not require the services of a handsomely remunerated business rescue practitioner. This reduces administrative costs for SMEs and all
other companies that make use of this alternative.
Although a compromise between a company and its creditors provides for a
less formal and more cost-effective form of corporate reorganization, it has its
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inherent weaknesses which make it unfeasible for an SME. Importantly, it does
not provide for an automatic moratorium against the company’s creditors during
the process of renegotiation of the obligations between a company and its creditors.
To promote a pragmatic business rescue procedure that is appropriate for
South African SMEs, the following recommendations are proposed:
First, a dual system form of business rescue, like the dual system proposed by Rajak & Henning, would create an accommodative corporate rescue mechanism for
SMEs. A categorizing approach where business rescue can either be informal or
informal depending on the size of the distressed company, its annual turnover as
well as the number employees that it employs would be useful. Separating these
two processes will be useful in reducing the costs of the business rescue.

Second, an informal procedure that would be less procedural and embody a
negotiated approach inherent in the Section 155 compromises between a company and its creditors must be implemented. This informal approach should be
in an alternative dispute resolution format in which a negotiation environment
will be cultivated between the company and its creditors that aims to reach a
compromise and the save relationships. Often, creditors are crucial key suppliers and investors, of paramount importance for the overall expansion of the
company.
The informal procedure would also include employees and/or employee
representatives during the renegotiation process and a strategic planning process. Employees have first-hand experience with the inherent challenges of the
business—especially with issues relating to clients and customers. Their contribution would help diagnose problems and develop valuable strategies for reorganization more than appointing a business rescue practitioner who is unfamiliar with the day-to-day running of the company. A proper diagnosis of the
problem by a business rescue practitioner and the development of a turnaround
strategy by an outsider without knowledge of the company is often timeconsuming and contributes to the amplified costs inherent in a Chapter 6 business rescue.
Third, the formal procedure inherent in business rescue should be reserved
for much larger corporate entities. The current business rescue procedure is
formal in nature and is workable only for large companies that can afford the
tariffs of business rescue procedure as well as the duration and administration
cost of business rescue.
Fourth, the scheme should include automatic moratoriums in company
compromises with creditors. The current compromise between a company and
its creditors provides several advantages to SMEs, one being the exclusion of
business rescue practitioners. This greatly reduces administrative costs. Nevertheless, the procedure remains cumbersome, over-regulated, and formal. The
legislature must include an automatic moratorium when a company enters a
compromise with its creditors. These may be either short-term or long-term
moratoriums, depending on the size of the company and the effectiveness of the
renegotiation processes. The inclusion of automatic moratoriums on compro-
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mises between a company and its creditors will reduce interferences from unhappy creditors.
Finally, government must subsidize business rescue proceedings for SMEs.
Since the government of South Africa is the principal supplier of SME corporate finance, it will be in the best interests of SMEs as well as the government to
help finance the restructuring process of ailing SMEs. State funding of SMEs
is, however, not enough to promote socio-economic development. The South
African Government should subsidize the costs of business rescue for government-financed SMEs. This would improve the accessibility of business rescue
proceedings to many SMEs. Moreover, establishing in-house business rescue
services by state institutions providing for SME incorporation and financing
would reduce the failure rate of the companies that play a useful role in creating
employment and reducing poverty. By subsidizing the business rescue of
SMEs, the government will not only help save state resources already invested
in these entities but will help bridge the gap between providing employment and
developing skills simultaneously. Importantly, it is not enough to finance SMEs
and watch them die from some form of financial distress that could have been
resolved through business rescue. Unless the current business rescue provision
embodied in Chapter 6 of the Companies Act of 2008 is reviewed, the process
will remain burdensome for SME companies, and they will be unable to make
use of the benefits of business rescue. This recommended review of business
rescue will help tailor the process for South African companies, especially SME
companies, which are at the heart of employment and overall socio-economic
development in South Africa.

